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Chapter One

THE CONSTITUTION


Article 1. SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION

(1) The Sovereignty of Ghana resides in the people of Ghana in whose name and for whose welfare the powers of government are to be exercised in the manner and within the limits laid down in this Constitution.

(2) The Constitution shall be the supreme law of Ghana and any other law found to be inconsistent with any provision of this Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.

Article 2. ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION

(1) A person who alleges that -

(a) An enactment or anything contained in or done under the authority of that or any other enactment; or

(b) Any act or omission of any person;

Is inconsistent with, or is in contravention of a provision of this Constitution, may bring an action in the Supreme Court for a declaration to that effect.

(2) The Supreme Court shall, for the purposes of a declaration under clause (1) of this article, make such orders and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for giving effect, or enabling effect to be given, to the declaration so made.

(3) Any person or group of persons of whom an order or direction is addressed under clause (2) of this article by the Supreme Court, shall duly obey and carry out the terms of the order or direction.

(4) Failure to obey or carry out the terms of an order or direction made or given under clause (2) of this article constitutes a high crime under this Constitution and shall, in the case of the President or the Vice-President, constitute a ground for removal from office under this Constitution.

(5) A person convicted of a high crime under clause (4) of this article shall -

(a) Be liable to imprisonment not exceeding ten years without the option of a fine; and

(b) Not be eligible for election, or for appointment, to any public office for ten years beginning with the date of the expiration of the term of imprisonment.

Article 3. DEFENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION

(1) Parliament shall have no power to enact a law establishing a one-party state.

(2) Any activity of a person or group of persons which suppresses or seeks to suppress the lawful political activity of any other person or any class of persons, or persons generally is unlawful.

(3) Any person who -

(a) by himself or in concert with others by any violent or other unlawful means, suspends or overthrows or abrogates this Constitution or any part of it, or attempts to do any such act; or

(b) Aids and abets in any manner any person referred to in paragraph (a) of this clause; commits the offence of high treason and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to suffer death.

(4) All citizens of Ghana shall have the right and duty at all times -

(a) To defend this Constitution, and in particular, to resist any prison or group of persons seeking to commit any of the acts referred to in clause (3) of this article; and

(b) To do all in their power to restore this Constitution after it has been suspended, overthrown, or abrogated as referred to in clause (3) of this article.

(5) Any person or group of persons who suppresses or resists the suspension, overthrow or abrogation of this Constitution as referred to in clause (3) of this article, commit no offence.

(6) Where a person referred to in clause (5) of this article is punished for any act done under that clause, the punishment shall, on the restoration of this Constitution, be taken to be void from the time it was imposed and he shall, from that time, be taken to be absolved from all liabilities arising out of the punishment.

(7) The Supreme Court shall, on application by or on behalf of a person who has suffered any punishment or loss to which clause (6) of this article relates, award him adequate compensation, which shall be charged on the Consolidated Fund, in respect of any suffering or loss incurred as a result of the punishment.


Interpretation/Insight

Article 1(2) Article 2(1)

TUFFOUR v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1980] GLR 637

The plaintiff is seeking a declaration from this court that on the coming into force of the Constitution of the Third Republic on 24 September 1979, Fred Kwasi Apaloo was deemed to have been appointed Chief Justice of the Republic and as such became president and member of the Supreme Court;

The defendants raise a preliminary objection to the capacity of the plaintiff. That a person asking for a relief had to have a cause of action for which a relief could be granted. The plaintiff was, however, claiming no relief for himself and had no interest in the case. The person who had an exclusive interest was Fred Kwasi Apaloo and the plaintiff had no community of interest with him. There was no inherent right for a person to ask for a declaration at common law. His writ had to show some form of relief. Even if the declaration was made it would not be binding since the plaintiff and Fred Kwasi Apaloo had no community of interest.

The Court held that whether or not Fred Kwasi Apaloo was the Chief Justice was not a private right. The interest of the plaintiff was a constitutional right exercisable by all citizens of Ghana by virtue of article 1 of the Constitution. And the plaintiff under article 1, need not have any community of interest with any person or authority. His community of interest was with the Constitution.

Article 2(1)

NEW PATRIOTIC PARTY v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1997-98] 1 GLR 378 - 461 COUNCIL OF INDIGENOUS BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS (CIBA) Case

The plaintiff, the New Patriotic Party, a political party registered under the laws of Ghana as a body corporate, issued a writ to invoke the original jurisdiction under articles 2(1) and 130 of the Constitution, 1992 for a declaration that:

"The Council of Indigenous Business Associations Law, 1993 (PNDCL 312) is inconsistent with and a contravention of, the Constitution, especially articles 21 (1) (e), 35(1), 37(2)(a) and (3), and that consequently, to the extent of such inconsistency, the said PNDCL 312 is void.

The Attorney-General raised a preliminary issue to the effect that the New Patriotic Party has no capacity or locus to commence an action under article 2(1) of the Constitution, 1992 on the ground that only a natural person can bring such an action.

The Court held that A "person" as defined in Section 32 of the Interpretation Act, 1960 (CA 4) to include a body corporate. Since that meaning fitted the context in which "person" was used in ## Article 2(1) of the Constitution, 1992 there was no necessity for applying the canons of statutory interpretation to determine its meaning. Moreover, the word "person" had been defined in ## Article 297 of the Constitution, 1992 to include a natural as well as a legal person or a corporate person such as the plaintiff. Accordingly, the plaintiff had locus in the case under ## Article 2(1).

Article 2(1)

SAM v ATTORNEY-GENERAL (No 2) [1999-2000] 2 GLR 336, [2000] SCGLR 305

The plaintiff, a citizen of Ghana, issued a writ to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under article 2(1) of the Constitution, 1992 for a declaration that section 15 of the Divestiture of State Interests (Implementation) Law, 1992 (PNDCL 326) was inconsistent with or in contravention of the provisions of article 140(1) and 293(2) of the Constitution, 1992 and to that extent, it was null and void

The Attorney-General, the defendant, raised a preliminary objection to the plaintiff’s action on the ground, inter alia, that the plaintiff had no standing to bring the suit since he had no personal interest in the outcome of the case, and consequently invited the court to strike out the plaintiff’s writ for lack of standing

The court held that the original interpretive and enforcement jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under article 2(1) of the Constitution, 1992 was a special jurisdiction available to any citizen of Ghana irrespective of personal interest. Under article 2(1) of the Constitution, 1992 any person who was a citizen was entitled to bring a suit to the Supreme Court if he alleged that an enactment or anything contained in that enactment was inconsistent with or in contravention of the Constitution and to obtain a declaration to that effect. Hence other requirements for standing like the dispute or controversy requirement or the personal requirement were not necessary when invoking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under article 2(1) of the Constitution, 1992.

Hence other requirements for standing like the dispute or controversy requirement or the personal requirement were not necessary when invoking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under article 2(1) of the Constitution, 1992.

See

FEDERATION OF YOUTH ASSOCIATION OF GHANA (FEDYAG) V PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES OF GHANA AND OTHERS (J1/5/2009) [2011] GHASC 53

Article 2(1)

ADJEI-AMPOFO (NO. 1) V ACCRA METROPOLITAN ASSEMBLY AND ATTORNEY-GENERAL (NO 1) [2007-08] I SCGLR 611

The Plaintiff claim under article 2(1) that the practice whereby the first Defendant, Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) employed certain persons to remove or carry on their heads human faeces from residents in various parts of the Accra Metropolis is unconstitutional because it is against article 15(1) and (2) of the 1992 constitution.

The first defendant raised a preliminary objection to the Plaintiff's action on the grounds that the plaintiff had no locus standi (standing to bring the matter before the court) in the matter. The court also has no jurisdiction to entertain the case since the plaintiff’s action rested on article 15(1) and (2) which falls under Chapter Five of the fundamental human rights and freedoms. Therefore the High Court is the appropriate avenue for the case.

The court held that the actions of the first defendant violate article 15(1) and (2) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.

Again, the court held that the objective of Article 2(1) of the 1992 constitution was to foster the enforcement of all provisions of the constitution by encouraging all Ghanaians (whether natural persons or corporate) to access the original jurisdiction of the supreme court in the interest of the general public. The outcome of an action under article 2(1) is beneficial to the citizenry in general and it might not necessarily inure to the benefit of the Plaintiff therein.

Furthermore, the court held that although the High Court's jurisdiction in Article 140(2) appears to be very broad, the provision is nothing more than a practical restatement of the exception to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, as defined by Article 130(1), in cases brought under Article 2(1). The High Court enforcement power is, therefore, to be exercised within the scope of Article 33(1), the language of which is clear. Hence the emphasis we must not lose sight of in Article 33(1) is the phrase "in relation to him." In other words, in the High Court, the actual, ongoing or threatened contravention of the fundamental human rights or freedom must be in relation to the plaintiff and none else. However, where the human right or freedom sought to be enforced is not in relation to the plaintiff’s personal rights and freedoms, but for the purpose of enforcing a provision of the Constitution under Article 2(1), the proper court is the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in such a case is determined by whether or not the plaintiff is pursuing a personal interest.

See: Article 2(1) Article 130 Article 33 Article 15(1) and (2)

EDUSEI V ATTORNEY-GENERAL [1996-97] SCGLR 97 Edusei (No2) v Attorney-General [1998-99] SCGLR 753, Oppon v Attorney-General [2003-2004] 1 SCGLR 376, Bimpong-Buta v General Legal Council [2003-2005] 1 GLR 738 for the enforcement of a provision of the Constitution in interest of the public good as in the NPP V ATTORNEY-GENERAL (CIBA Case)[1996-7] SCGLR729 SAM (NO 2) V ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2000] I SCGLR 305